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Architectural 
Anti-Mimesis
“Le concept de mimesis n’est pas seulement 
insuffisant, mais radicalement faux.”  
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: „Capi-
talisme et schizophrénie - Mille plateaux”, 
p. 374
Does the east façade of 
Herzog and de Meuron’s 
Schaulager in Basel (fig. 1) 
resemble the east façade 
of Le Corbusier’s Chapel 
of Notre Dame du Haut 
in Ronchamp (fig. 2)? Did 
mimesis or imitation occur 
between these two works of 
architecture? In this essay, I 
argue that imitation did not 
occur here or indeed be-
tween any two works of ar-
chitecture. I make this claim 
by situating and consider-
ing architecture within a 
relational ontology informed 
by the philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze. Imitation does not 
feature as a concept within 
this ontology; instead, I will 
show that the concept of 
haecceity – a term coined 
by the scholastic philoso-
pher Johannes Duns Scotus 
denoting “thisness” – and 
the Deleuzian concept of 
“becoming” are more appro-
priate to a realistic analysis 
of architecture. 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
“Course in General Linguis-
tics”, published in 1916, but 
based on earlier lectures, 
states: “In the language itself, there are 
only differences. Even more important than 
that is the fact that, although in general 
a difference presupposes positive terms 
between which the difference holds, in a 
Tim Gough
 1  Schaulager (Emanuel Hoffmann-Stiftung), Basel/Münchenstein, 
Switzerland, 2003. Architect: Herzog & de Meuron.
 2  Chapel of Notre Dame du Haut, Ronchamp, France, 1955. Architect: 
Le Corbusier.
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language there are only differences, and 
no positive terms.”1 These words propose 
a kind of general theory of relativity,2 and 
they imply a profound shift in the ontology 
of the world. As Gilles Deleuze, the most 
effective promulgator (to date)3 of this 
shift, states in his earliest published work, 
what this means is that “relations are 
external to their terms.”4 At bottom, the 
terms of any relation are not of primary 
interest. It is the relations between terms 
which are philosophically and ontologi-
cally primary. One way of saying this is to 
use the word “fold”, as Deleuze does in 
his book on Leibniz.5 The significance of 
the fold is not that it comes to topologically 
transform a sheet or a plane, but rather 
that the fold comes first. There is nothing 
other than folds within folds to infinity, and 
the sheet or the plane is an after-effect 
of those folds. The fold comes first and 
makes the sheet. Things, objects, subjects 
are “merely” the after-effect of the fold, 
or the event. To put it in Derridean terms, 
they are the after-effect of “différance”. 
Or, to put it in Nietzschean terms follow-
ing Deleuze’s early book on Nietzsche, 
meaning and sense are the after effect 
of a “differential element from which its 
significance is derived (…)”6
In a short essay in Eduardo Cadava’s 
book “Who Comes After the Subject?” 
Deleuze makes the following point 
about how concepts (such as that of 
resemblance and mimesis) relate to their 
field of effectiveness: “A philosophical 
concept fulfils several functions in fields 
of thought that are themselves defined by 
internal variables. There are also external 
variables (states of things, moments in 
history), in a complex relation with the 
internal variables and the functions. This 
means that a concept does not die simply 
when one wants it to, but only when new 
functions in a new field discharge it. This 
is also why it is never very interesting to 
criticize a concept: it is better to build 
the new functions and discover the new 
fields that make it useless or inadequate.”7 
Deleuze’s answer to “who comes after the 
subject?” is that the concept of the subject 
does not die, but rather becomes useless 
or inadequate because of the creation of 
new fields of concepts which interrelate 
with each other in a different way. It is the 
task of the philosopher to create these new 
concepts and fields,8 and he speaks here 
of a “transcendental field without subject” 
within which the subject – and with it the 
object and representation – does not ap-
pear, and therefore becomes useless.
This transcendental field without subject, 
object or representation gets laid out most 
thoroughly in the “mechanosphere” of 
Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s “A Thousand 
Plateaus”. The mechanosphere is the name 
given by them to an entire ontology and 
epistemology of new concepts which are 
set out in this book. Following Foucault, on-
tology and epistemology – the question of 
being and the question of knowledge – are 
the same thing, since all being is always 
already related to knowledge. There is no 
primitive access to being prior to knowledge, 
this being one of Deleuze’s criticisms of 
phenomenology.9 This is symptomatic of 
Deleuze’s avowed “constructivism” or, as 
Quentin Meillassoux would say – being 
critical – his “correlationism”: things, includ-
ing knowledge, always happen for Deleuze 
as a correlation between what an old 
ontology would call subject and object,10 
which in this new ontology get evaporated 
or treated as an after-effect of something 
more primary. This mechanosphere is res-
olutely anti-mimetic, anti-representational 
and opposed to the notion of resemblance. 
As Deleuze and Guattari state in Plateau 
10 entitled “Becoming Intense”,11 “no art is 
imitative, no art can be imitative or figura-
tive”.12 This is because art (and everything) 
is concerned with “becomings”, or events 
– what they term “haecceities”. What may 
be “interpreted” and “given meaning” as 
imitation or resemblance is, in the reality 
of the mechanosphere, an assemblage or 
conjunction of two multiplicities whereby 
the one sets itself in relation with the other 
– and “vice versa”. This means that the 
question of the original and resemblance 
becomes unimportant or uninteresting. 
Deleuze and Guattari are here close to 
Blanchot’s “Two Versions of the Imaginary”, 
where the image, that which supposedly 
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comes after that which it represents, in fact 
is shown to be that which grants the very 
possibility of what we would like to be sure 
is the original.13
The “becomings” of which Deleuze and 
Guattari write are “machines” or assem-
blages (“dispositives” in the French) which 
occur as events. Architecturally, we can say 
that architecture occurs as the event or  
assemblage of the interplay of us and the 
environment in which we live. This idea 
needs to be understood in its full impli-
cations. There is no pre-existing “subject” 
which comes to inhabit an “object” (i.e. a 
building or an environment). What comes 
first is the symbiosis of the two, what Deleuze 
and Guattari call a “block of co-existing”14, 
which means that in this ontology (or epis-
temology) the subject and the object do not 
exist prior to what we could call the particu-
lar “individuality” of architecture. What is 
prior is the interplay (i.e. architecture), the 
relations between the terms, not the terms 
themselves (subject/object, or inhabitant/
building). Assemblages – and this is some-
thing which gets ignored by interpretations 
of Deleuze still in hock to an outmoded 
objectivist ontology – are always “social”. 
This is something Deleuze emphasises in his 
“Foucault” book, and which he gets directly 
from Foucault.15 “A Thousand Plateaus” is 
so resolutely concerned with the interplays 
between the social and the material that we 
could call it an entire anthropology, were it 
not for the fact that it is precisely the topic of 
man or human (“anthropos”) which is called 
into question here, as we will see below.
Architecture is like the interplay of the wasp 
and the orchid. Deleuze and Guattari give 
this example of a “becoming” several times 
in “A Thousand Plateaus”.16 This interplay 
is a participation between two entirely 
different things, which makes these different 
things possible. The interplay gives the 
wasp and the orchid their very possibility 
of existence, since they cannot exist without 
each other. Again, it is the relation between 
the two of them, this interplay, which is pri-
mary. The terms of the relation – the wasp 
itself, the orchid itself – are secondary to 
the event which occurs between them. This 
raises the question of resemblance: after all, 
is it not the case that the orchid “resembles” 
the wasp in order to attract it? The answer 
given is that resemblance has nothing to 
do with it, except within a conventional 
mode of looking (a conventional ontology) 
that assumes the pre-existence of either the 
wasp to the orchid or vice versa.17 Rather, 
their interplay is some sort of co-evolution, 
a “block of becoming”18 or a haecceity.19 
Architecture, in turn, is such an “haecceity”. 
Deleuze and Guattari give other exam-
ples – a horse falling in the street, or a dog 
running in the road, or a cat hunting at 
five o’clock. These things have to be under-
stood as a single individuality, all at once: 
“horse-cart-cobble stones-street” or “dog-
running-in-the-road” or “cat-at-five-o’clock”.  
And architecture therefore has to be under-
stood as us-and-environment in an intimate 
and pre-existing real correlation: we are 
always already within it, within the relation 
as terms of a relation that do not pre-exist 
that interplay. As Deleuze and Guattari say: 
“(…) you will yield nothing to haecceities un-
less you realise that that is what you are, and 
that you are nothing but that.”20 
The work of Herzog & de Meuron consti-
tutes – often – just such a haecceity. Their 
architecture is an assemblage (“dispositive”), 
a machine made up of many particles of 
different types – memory, space, materi-
ality, the visitor or inhabitant themselves, 
literary allusions – a machine with which 
it would not so much be said that we are 
engaged, but rather a machine that we are 
(Deleuze and Guattari quote Virginia Wolf: 
“The thin dog is running in the road, this 
dog is the road.”21). If we take an obvious 
example such as the façade of the Schau-
lager, this should therefore not be seen as 
imitative of the east side of Ronchamp, as 
Stanislaus von Moos has argued.22 What 
the architects are doing is not repeating the 
“form” of the earlier building; nor are they 
recapitulating a process of design; rather, 
they are establishing the possibility of the 
event of architecture – a haecceity – which 
occurs at Schaulager and within which 
there is a Ronchamp-becoming. 
How does this non-resemblance work at 
Schaulager (fig. 1) and Ronchamp (fig. 2)? 
The scale and disposition of the east-facing 
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entrance façade of Schaulager, when 
occurring as “event”, resonates with the 
east façade of Ronchamp, initially in 
respect of the overhang and the encircling 
wings. As elsewhere in Herzog & de 
Meuron’s work, once caught in the grip 
of Schaulager, one has a very odd sense 
of “déjà-vu”, just as Proust, at certain 
points, manages to evoke in us that same 
“unheimlich” feeling of déjà-vu” by means 
of a resonance back to a previous point in 
his novel.23 Herzog & de Meuron do this, 
for instance, at the Tate Modern by means 
of the Turbine Hall’s resonance with other 
similarly scaled and disposed semi-internal 
spaces in London, such as Westminster 
Hall. At Schaulager it is the heard “sound” 
of the building that allows the drama of 
the event to occur most clearly. The upper 
part of the east façade of Schaulager ap-
pears to be a solid sheet of white-painted 
steel welded together on site, and this acts 
as a massive resonator, causing the whole 
of the space to hum in a most disconcert-
ing way. I do not know where the hum at 
Schaulager comes from; I think that the 
steel sheet is possibly echoing and acting 
as a sounding board for the electrical 
cables of the tramlines immediately ad-
jacent on the street (a technical issue the 
architects would be familiar with from their 
Basel signal box projects). Whatever the 
mysterious source, this hum is like the hum 
one will have experienced elsewhere; it 
relates to a previous art gallery project by 
the same architects – Tate Modern Turbine 
Hall, where, for a long time, the adjacent 
electricity substation caused a noticeable 
hum. But as strongly, it relates to the other 
events which Schaulager engages, namely 
that of standing-sheltered-by-Ronchamp.  
In what way does this event of sound 
function at Ronchamp? To answer this, 
one needs to visit it on a Sunday morning, 
standing within the east façade, when the 
bells of the other Ronchamp church in the 
valley are being rung after mass. Le  
Corbusier has arranged the east end of 
the chapel as a giant resonator, which 
gathers the sound of the bells from the 
valley below and re-projects them towards 
the visitor. This event, caused by an 
extremely considered state of affairs, is one 
where a sense of orientation and source 
is momentarily lost since Le Corbusier’s 
chapel itself appears to be ringing; as if, 
together with the votive statue of the Virgin 
hovering within the wall above you, there 
were a set of bells there in the east façade. 
But of course we know there is not.
In both these pieces of architecture – which 
I define here as the haecceity of the event – 
there is a constant building-becoming of us 
and a human-becoming of buildings. This 
to-and-fro, this “unnatural participation” or 
symbiosis between what we habitually call 
subject and object or human and building, 
this becoming (“devenir” in Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s original French) “is” architec-
ture. In other words, there is an entirely 
different ontology of architecture implied 
by the work of Herzog & de Meuron and 
Le Corbusier – an architecture of machinic 
interplay, of the human-becoming of 
buildings and the building-becoming of 
humans. Except that “human-becoming” is 
not a term Deleuze and Guattari would 
use. What is it that one is becoming in these 
circumstances? Perhaps, as they argue, it is 
a question of “woman-becoming”.24 Why 
woman-becoming? Because it is impossible 
for man to become. “Man” cannot become 
in this way because the concept of man – a 
majoritarian concept, a controlling concept 
– only makes sense within a now-outmoded 
ontology. What can become must in some 
way be a minority, which does not mean a 
numerical minority but rather that which is 
(traditionally) given second place. We must 
allow ourselves to become something other 
than “man” in order to participate in this 
ontology, in this haecceity of architecture.
Two questions might be asked of this anal-
ysis. Firstly, what authorises this particular 
interpretation of Schaulager in respect of 
Ronchamp? After all, if one were to ap-
proach Schaulager from another direction, 
say from the car park at the rear rather 
than the overhanging main entrance at 
the front, one’s subjective impressions 
might well be entirely different. Rather 
than an interplay with the work of Le Cor-
busier, one might instead see the building 
as a huge block of soil raised up out of 
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the surrounding field (fig. 3).25 The play 
here is not so much with another piece of 
architecture, but more with the situation in 
which the building finds itself. I would make 
several points in relation to this: a) this 
play, again, is not related to any concept or 
deployment of mimesis. Rather, an interplay 
has been set up between the building and 
its immediate surroundings. b) This interplay 
does not begin from fixed pre-existing terms, 
but rather the terms (the building, and the 
surroundings) only occur as a result of the 
interplay between them. Schaulager does 
not respond to a pre-existing site, but rather 
creates its own site by setting itself off 
against something which it itself creates, just 
like the orchid and the wasp. And c), the 
radical differences in interpretation speak 
to the efficacy of this ontology of architec-
ture. For if architecture is regarded as an 
haecceity which each of us participates in, 
then what might mark a strong piece of ar-
chitecture is its ability to call forth an indef-
inite number of rich interpretations in those 
who come to inhabit or engage with it. The 
architectural interplay between people and 
place differs according to the prejudices 
and happenstances that people bring to 
it, just as it can be argued that great works 
of literature – one thinks of Shakespeare – 
are great precisely because they open an 
infinitely rich set of possible interpretations. 
How do they do this? – precisely by un-
derstanding – implicitly or explicitly – that 
it is not the terms of the relationships (for 
example, one particular interpretation) which 
defines the thing, but rather the setting up of 
relationships which can allow many different 
terms to flourish.
 3  Schaulager (Emanuel Hoffmann-Stiftung), Basel/Münchenstein, Switzerland, 2003. Rear view. Architect: Herzog & 
de Meuron.
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Secondly, one might ask what justification 
there is in linking the built work of Herzog 
& de Meuron with the philosophy of 
Deleuze and Guattari.26 After all, they are 
not on record as having themselves made 
a connection with French philosophy in 
the way that they have engaged with, say, 
the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer.27 My 
argument here is not, however, to draw 
such a direct link. Rather, I am interested 
in how – if architecture is considered 
within a differential ontology of the type 
which Deleuze and Guattari outline – 
what appears to be a resemblance drawn 
between two works of architecture in fact 
becomes something entirely different, and 
the question of mimesis then disappears. 
There is, however, a transverse linkage to 
be made, which runs via the topic of play 
and the playful character of Herzog & de 
Meuron’s work. When talking about their 
Allianz Arena (fig. 4) in Munich, Jacques 
Herzog has stated: “I love football (…) I 
also played for a long time myself, and 
today I am a passionate spectator in the 
stadium”; and “[i]nteraction, reinforcing 
emotions, is the most important aspect 
in all our projects(...)”; and “Pierre de 
Meuron and I played together as chil-
dren(…)”28. This tells us that what interests 
them is not the building as object, but 
rather the event which is architecture. 
We could say analogously: if our topic of 
investigation were football, then it would be 
assumed that we were not interested in the 
football as a round object made of leather 
stitched together. Of course, some people 
are legitimately interested in the football as 
such an object that fulfils certain technical 
and other objective requirements. It is just 
that this objective concern is recognised 
as rather remote from an interest in foot-
ball per se.If we say we are interested in 
football, that does not generally mean we 
are interested in the football, but rather in 
football as a series of playful relationships 
between the players, the ball, the pitch, the 
spectators and of course the stadium (the 
Allianz Arena or any other), but also the 
rules, the myths, the memories, the loyal-
ties and many other particles of varying 
types which go to make up football. All 
these named terms occur only within and 
are given validity only within the playful 
relationships which are, in this ontology, 
football. To conclude the analogy: no less 
should we regard architecture per se not as 
an object which resembles another building 
or another object (the Allianz Arena itself 
looks like a football!) but rather as the set 
of relationships of which these objects are a 
derived part. 
This transverse linkage can also be ex-
tended to the philosophy of Gadamer. He, 
 4  Allianz Arena, Munich-Fröttmaning, Germany, 2005. Architect: Herzog & de Meuron. 
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too, speaks of play as having the same 
ontology as the work of art, and in particu-
lar the same ontology as architecture. In 
his magnum opus “Truth and Method” he 
states, in the chapter entitled “Play as the 
clue to ontological explanation” that, in the 
end, “the movement of play as such has, as 
it were, no substrate” („Die Spielbewegung 
als solche ist gleichsam ohne Substrat.“).29 
This lack of substrate of play is the moment  
where he acknowledges, exactly as Deleuze  
and Guattari do, the primacy of difference 
or relation over the terms of those relations. 
What Gadamer therefore also does – nec-
essarily so, since it is implied in all relational 
ontologies – is to question mimesis; in 
contrast to Deleuze’s and Guattari’s more 
radical approach, the way he does this is 
to recast the notion of mimesis and unlink 
it, essentially, from the idea of imitation 
or resemblance: “The concept of mimesis 
(…) did not mean a copy so much as the 
appearance of what is presented.” („Der 
Begriff der Mimesis (...) meinte nicht so 
sehr Abbildung, als die Erscheinung des 
Dargestellten.“)30
Within Deleuze’s and Guattari’s playful 
ontology, mimesis thought of as imitation is 
a non-question. Mimesis does not figure as 
significant within the operation of the field 
of variables and functions which make up 
this philosophy. There is no original thing 
or object which comes to be resembled by 
the second object which the architect is 
supposedly miming. Nor is there some pro-
cess of nature which comes to be mimicked 
by the process of design. Firstly, because 
there is no object. Architecture is not of the 
status of objects, but rather is “une machine 
à habiter”31 – a machine not for living “in” 
(as often poorly translated into English), 
but rather a machine for or of living, an 
always-social assemblage (“dispositive”).
Secondly, nor are these events of archi-
tecture mimed or copied. As Deleuze and 
Guattari state: “No art is imitative, no art 
can be imitative or figurative. Suppose a 
painter ‘represents’ a bird: this is in fact a 
becoming-bird that can occur only to the 
extent that the bird itself is in the process of 
becoming something else, a pure line and 
pure colour. Thus imitation self-destructs, 
since the imitator unknowingly enters into 
a becoming that conjugates with the un-
knowing becoming of that which he or she 
imitates.”32
What is happening with Ronchamp-Schau- 
lager is not a formal transposition of a 
shape of enclosure from one place to an-
other, but the Ronchamp-becoming of the 
event of Schaulager and the Schaulager- 
becoming of the event of Ronchamp. Within 
the ontology I am outlining here, these 
are not buildings, but the always-already 
occurring event of the haecceity of us. We 
call these types of haecceity architecture 
because they include buildings and envi-
ronments within their activity, just as one 
would call music not the pure sound, but 
rather the interplay of the sound and the 
person, the sound-becoming of woman and 
the woman-becoming of sound; just as one 
would call art not the fresco on the wall 
but the event of one-looking-at-the-fresco. 
These events are already what Deleuze 
and Guattari call multiplicities, multiplic-
ities which include us as well as many 
other particles such as memory, space, 
material, concepts (…) Ronchamp only 
occurs as us, and Schaulager only occurs 
as us. This means that as soon as there 
is some connection between the two (for 
instance, we visit Schaulager on Saturday 
and Ronchamp on Sunday) the desire of 
the architects for a becoming that infects 
each of the events is realised. There is no 
metaphor or abstraction posited here in the 
Ronchamp-becoming of the event of Schau-
lager and the Schaulager-becoming of the 
event of Ronchamp. Rather, this is what 
actually can happen as a real event. What 
is unreal, abstract and derived is the object; 
what is unreal, abstract and derived is the 
resemblance of one object to another; and 
what great architects like Le Corbusier and 
Herzog & de Meuron do is to quite deliber-
ately work instead with the possibilities of 
the real: with the haecceity of architecture.
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